From Spears to Aircraft

A Sophisticated Flying Machine: A series of incremental technological changes has brought this configuration into existence.

This post by GilDodgen on Uncommon Descent gives an indication of the central place that Irreducible Complexity (IC) has in the ID theoretical canon; everything in ID theory seems to be either an aspect of this principle or a detail. This is what GilDodgen says:

The more we learn the more it appears that almost everything of any significance in living systems is irreducibly complex. Multiple systems must almost always be simultaneously modified to proceed to the next island of function. Every software engineer knows this, and living things are fundamentally based on software.

Evolution in the fossil record is consistently characterized by major discontinuities — as my thesis about IC being a virtually universal rule at all levels, from the cell to human cognition and language, would suggest — and the discontinuity between humans and all other living things is the most profound of all. Morphological similarities are utterly swamped by the profound differences exhibited by human language, math, art, engineering, ethics, and much more.


GilDodgen then goes on to suggest that the vast differences between human beings and other primates are evidence of the discontinuity imposed by IC.

In biological terms the crucial concept is structural stability; that is the ability to self perpetuate. But this is only possible if the components of a biological structure serve to promote self perpetuation and they can only do this if they work; that is if they function correctly.

Crucially for ID, GilDodgen assumes that functionality only comes in absolutely isolated islands; that is any change of a structure that goes beyond a certain small threshold entails a loss of functionality and thus a non-viable unstable structure. Thus if IC is true then there are no incremental entry points in or out of a stable structure. Thus IC structures (by definition) have no stable precursor structures incrementally separated from them. Ergo, evolution cannot happen.

The inverse of the notion of IC is Reducible Complexity (RC); RC requires that the domains of functionality/stability are so connected that there exist ways of incrementally modifying a structure and yet a stable structure being the result. The RC conjecture is that there is class of functional/stable structures that form a fully connected set and that a broad range of structural complexity is found in this set; if such exists then a barrier to evolution is lifted.

Of great significance to ID theory is this quote from GilDodgen: “Multiple systems must almost always be simultaneously modified to proceed to the next island of function”. That simultaneous modification is the only way to reach the next island of stability is, in the mind of the ID theorist, sufficient evidence of the complete isolation of islands of stability in a huge sea of non-viability; for to jump the gap between islands of functionality using random changes would require the simultaneous adjustment of several features in just the right way. The probability of these changes coming together is utterly negligible and thus a barrier of improbability isolates the islands of stability. The only thing that we know capable of jumping the space between the islands is intelligence.

Currently I have several issues with the concept of IC. The following points are really areas of research rather than killer arguments against IC.

1) If the only way to reach a near neighbor stable structure is by a very rare simultaneous change of features, then the IC case holds. However, if a route exists to a stable neighborhood structures via a “path” consisting of a series of incremental changes to single features ,each of which results in a stable structure, then we have a Reducibly Complex connected set of structures. However, these "single feature change" pathways are likely to be a relatively rare occurrence in the space of all possible changes, thus giving the impression that they don’t exist.

2) Human technological advance has only been possible because the limited quantum of human intelligence (call it i) can leap the gap between islands of functionality. But, and here is the important point, i is not large enough to leap the gap between stone age spears and GilDodgen’s aircraft in one leap. However, it is clear that the islands of functionality in technological configuration space are close enough so that given the quantum of human intelligence, i, the human mind can leap the gaps in functionality leading up to an sophisticated flying machine. It is conceivable that there are structures out there that can never be reached by the human mind because they are effectively irreducibly complex with respect to the quantum of human intelligence i. Nevertheless, it is clear that given human technology, large parts of technological configuration space are connected enough (i.e they reducible complexity with respect to i) to make technological evolution possible. It seems that IC and RC are not binary opposites but come in degrees. Fortunately for us technological configuration space is reducibly complex with respect to i. But, and this is the 64 billion dolllar question, is biological configuration space sufficiently connected with respect to the blind watch maker?


3) Human Intelligence itself appears to employ a kind of evolution; it makes a series of incremental adjustments to its concepts, concepts that are either selected or rejected; search, reject and select is the general evolutionary algorithm.

Serpentine Logic

That devolved legless reptile is doing its damnedest to stay in the picture

Interesting is this post on Uncommon Descent concerning ID guru William Dembski’s book “The End of Christianity, Finding a Good God in an Evil World”. This is what Dembski says about the book.

My book attempts to resolve how the Fall of Adam could be responsible for all evil in the world, both moral and natural IF the earth is old and thus IF a fossil record that bespeaks violence among organisms predates the temporal occurrence of the Fall. My resolution is to argue that just as the salvation of Christ purchased at the Cross acts forward as well as backward in time (the Old Testament saints were saved in virtue of the Cross), so too the effects of the Fall can go backward in time. Showing how this could happen requires extensive argument and is the main subject of the book. As for my title, “End of Christianity” involves a play on words – “end” can refer to cessation or demise; but it can also refer to goal or purpose. I mean the latter, as the subtitle makes clear: Finding a Good God in an Evil World.

The link to the interview with Dembski also worth looking at.

Some comments

1. Although he minces his words and hedges (Not surprisingly given his particular Christian sub-culture) my guess is that Dembski is an “Old Earth” believer; otherwise his attempt to explain pre-fall evil as a “retroactive” result of an anthropocentric fall would seem rather futile.(Note: If the act of God in Christ is a powerful symbolic declaration of covenant by God and revealed in the fullness of time, then its ability to dispense grace retroactively is less enigmatic, whereas I can make little sense of a retroactive fall in this light)

2. In line with Young Earth Evangelicalism’s world view Dembski assumes evil and suffering to be largely sourced anthropocentrically. And yet the serpent in Genesis 3 could be construed as a symbol of the presence of extra-human evil. The person(s) who penned Genesis 3, as is the wont of arcadian folk, would be ever aware of the lurking presence of evil in an unseen world. There is also the question over the interpretation of the enigmatic Romans 8:18-23 , a passage which hints that the cause of evil and suffering is not quite so crisp and clear cut as traditional Young Earth Evangelicalism would have it.

3. The problem Dembski is addressing comes out of contemporary Young Earth Evangelicalism’s world view and is thus very pressing in his own intellectual circles. Some of us, such as myself, who feel that there are deeper mysteries surrounding the source of suffering and evil have a less pressing need to explain pre-fall suffering. According to my concordance the word “good” of Genesis 1 is not quite the same as the word perfect (~ completion). I wonder what Dembski teaches his seminary students?

I have been a close witness of evangelical philosophy for over thirty years and its sometimes cursory and shallow treatment of suffering and evil is not its only short fall. So much about standard evangelical explanations fail to make sense of the world around us, not to mention its inconsonance with aspects of my own personal experience. It’s no wonder that when pressed the fallback position of many evangelicals is fideism: Viz: “Faith is not always logical, if it was it would not be faith.” In the fideist mind the ability of faith to accommodate mystery is conflated with the ability to swallow illogicality. But I’ll hand it to William Dembski, he is brave guy (and a nice guy as far as I can tell) and he is making a very valiant attempt at being be logical. Pity about some of his fellow pilgrims.

World Beater

I must admit that I share some of Denise O’ Leary’s doubts about the democratic intentions of the “new atheists”. Stalinist atheism is to liberal atheism as Inquisitional Christianity is to liberal Christianity. Is “new atheism” a Stalinist form of atheism? Well, as far as I’m concerned that question remains to be answered. Given the insults, accusations of “scientific heresy” and unreason screamed out by some “new atheists” (even to fellow atheists) I have to say that I’m not at all confident that democracy would be in safe pair of hands should they gain exclusive political control. They are reminiscent of the revolutionary Marxists: “If you are not for us you are against us; we will see to your ‘re-education’ after the revolution.” The best complexion I can place on it is that in the wider social economy Stalinist atheism and Inquisitional Christianity are a reaction of one to the other and that somehow they cancel out. Hopefully.

Left Out in the Cold

This post by William Dembski may give some indication of the social circles he is connected with. I’m not going to comment on the issue of what Dembski calls anthropogenic global warming (except to say notice “anthropogenic” here – does that mean that global warming is less the issue than is the cause of global warming?), but the post does provide insight into the human and political dimension of the ID/evolution debate.

Ever the malaise of those who feel unjustly marginalised, I get a whiff of conspiracy theory when Dembski quotes from an article on global warming found in a newsweb of the religious right.

“It is not hard to think up ways to scare people into handing over more of their cash via taxes, insurance, inflation, etc. You just have to think of the right nightmare, publicize it, politicize it, turn it into curriculum, and sooner or later people will gladly hand you loads of moola with tears in their eyes.”


This right wing newsweb promotes “What the bible says about creation” over and against what “science says”. Given this polarised notion of "bible vs. science" I think we can guess what their views are. (see here)

And yet I sympathize with Dembski when he says:

"How, in other words, to create a scientific climate in which anyone who disagrees with AGW [anthropogentic global warming] can be written off as a crank, whose views do not have a scrap of authority.” Where have I heard that sort of thing before?"

It’s no surprise that Dembski identifies with the anti-anthropogentic global warming lobby given how he has been treated over his evolution/ID work.

William Dembski and friends have been left out in the cold - no wonder they don't believe in Global Warming

So Long Pilgrim

This post on UD publicizes a new book called “Should Christians Embrace Evolution”. The post says:

Believers in a God-guided Darwinism are preaching that Darwinism is a fact and that the Bible can be reconciled with it. This new book comprehensively refutes both ideas. Far from necessary, theistic evolution is both bad theology and bad science.

Firstly: It is impossible for evolution to be “a fact” in the sense that gravitational theory is “a fact”. Gravitational theory deals with a relatively simple mathematical object, whereas evolution, if it has occurred, may be computationally irreducible. So to be fair, all due allowance must be made for evolution’s level of epistemological intractability; just as one must make epistemological allowance for something as complex as deity. I would classify evolution less “bad science” than “difficult science”. And let's not forget that we must also make all due allowance for the scientific difficulties ID theory itself faces. For there is a very wide range of theories held by ID theorists; from those who accept an evolution of sorts from common descent to those who believe God "poofed" the whole cosmic show, as seen, into existence 6000 years ago. So it is clear that ID theory has at least as great epistemological difficulties as evolution. People who live in glass houses should not throw stones.

Secondly: What about bad theology? Well, the prodigal son went through a process of incremental learning and development and yet there came the time when he was self aware enough to willfully reject the right way. Moreover, the environment in which he was reared was good but not perfect.

Looking through the list of book contributors I get a distinct whiff of raw evangelicalism here and there. This does suggest that I am unlikely to be comfortable with the religious culture of many contemporary ID supporters. And yet ironically I accept the general notion of design; namely that the elemental must have its source in a-priori complexity; I personally identify that a-priori complexity with a personal God. But it seems to me that for most contemporary ID supporters the bear and general notion of design is less important to them than a very vocal and specific anti-evolutionism. In fact it even seems that theism is less important to them than anti-evolutionism. In this connection I wasn’t aware that Steve Fuller is a theist, anymore than I was aware that David Belinsky is a theist, but these people connect very well with contemporary ID theory’s prevalent culture of de-facto anti-evolutionism. As I endeavor to be a non-aligned party in the ID/evolution debate I find I cannot support the raw emotionalism and an anti-evolutionism that is so often bound up with the vested interests and crowd dynamics of contemporary ID culture. In many respects ID culture has burnt its boats. It has passed the point of no return.

As I explore links between evolution, quantum theory, algorithmics, intelligence and learning it looks as though I’m on a very different pilgrimage to many contemporary ID theorists.

On Uncommon Descent

I’m currently having a very fruitful discussion with an Uncommon Descent poster. See here.

Nothing is Simple. Something is ... well, Something Else!

I recently heard an argument to the effect that there is no problem in the universe coming from nothing because current cosmological evidence points to a flat universe; in such a universe positive energy is completely cancelled by negative gravitational energy and therefore the universe could have come from nothing. (I suppose a similar point could be made about cancelling electric charges)

Now, I think this mathematical jiggery-pokery was all rather tongue in cheek and not meant to be taken seriously. So with my tongue also firmly in my cheek let me engage in a little mathematical sleight of hand.

Let me define a quantity that I call the quadratic field operator. This operator takes a differentiated field of energy and sums up the squares of the energy components. If we start with absolutely nothing at all then clearly the quadratic field operator returns zero (=nothing). No problem. But as soon as there is any differentiation of energy into a field of cancelling negative and positive energy components the quadratic field operator quietly slips past the outer parentheses into the field of energy and hey presto you end up with a finite quantity (=something) Thus, if absolutely nothing suddenly resolves itself into a field of canceling energy terms the quadratic field operator reveals that something has come from nothing. Tough luck! We are back to square one! (or should that be square zero?)

Of course, all this by passes some rather abstruse philosophical questions: Do the “laws of physics” have any real meaning unless they are reified on an existing material ontology? What comes first; the laws of physics or the stuff whose patterns of behavior those laws describe? Does the description of an ontology proceed the ontology it describes? Do ethereal immaterial laws actually bring something into existence? Can existence be treated as a mere property that may be attributed or unattributed to an entity, or is it a fundamentally different category all together? I seem to remember that Anselm’s ontological argument foundered on this latter question!

Darwin Bicententary Part 28: The Mystery of Life’s Origin, Chapter 8

Continuing my consideration of the three online chapters of Thaxton, Bradley and Olson’s book “The Mystery of Life’s Origin”

As far as chapter 8 is concerned I can cut a long story short; Thaxton, Bradley and Olson calculate the Gibbs free energy associated with the formation of the information bearing bio-polymers essential for life. They come to the conclusion that this free energy is positive - as one would expect from a process involving a polymerization that uses energy to form the required molecular bounds and also to work against entropy in order to secure the right molecular configuration. I can see no fundamental flaw or controversy in TB&O’s conservative estimates. At the end of the chapter 7 they draw the conclusion that life’s information bearing bio-polymers are not going to form in near equilibrium conditions. However, they make this final comment:

In the next chapter we will consider various theoretical models attempting to show how energy flow through the system can be useful in doing the work quantified in this chapter for the polymerization of DNA and protein. Finally, we will examine experimental efforts to accomplish biomacromolecule synthesis.

Thus, TB&O leave us with the same cliff hanger that I felt I was left with in the previous chapter: If life has any chance of forming naturally that chance will only be found, if it is to be found at all, in disequilibrium conditions where there is an energy flowing through a system’s subsystems. Thus, it may be possible that this energy flow can be used to produce organic structures with high Gibbs energies …. or perhaps not.

***

Remark
Chapter 8 has a more promising view of the nature of living configurations than the previous chapter. In the previous chapter (as I said) TB&O seem to conflate complexity and order, but in this chapter they tell us (rightly I believe) that living structures are neither highly ordered nor highly disordered and thus classify as something else. They note that the aperiodicity of bio-polymers resemble the aperiodicity of random arrangements of bases, both of which are very different from the high order of crystals, but TB&O then go on to tell us just what distinguishes bio-polymers from random polymers:

Only certain sequences of letters correspond to sentences, and only certain sequences of sentences correspond to paragraphs, etc. In the same way only certain sequences of amino acids in polypeptides and bases along polynucleotide chains correspond to useful biological functions. Thus, informational macro-molecules may be described as being and in a specified sequence. Orgel notes: “Living organisms are distinguished by their specified complexity. Crystals fail to qualify as living because they lack complexity; mixtures of random polymers fail to qualify because they lack specificity”

However, in my view TB&O are still presenting a rather obscure answer to the question of just where living configurations stand in relation to order and disorder, referring only to a mysterious property they call “specified complexity”. To try and clarify this they say:

Yockey and Wickens develop the same distinction, that "order" is a statistical concept referring to regularity such as could might characterize a series of digits in a number, or the ions of an inorganic crystal. On the other hand, "organization" refers to physical systems and the specific set of spatio-temporal and functional relationships among their parts. Yockey and Wickens note that informational macromolecules have a low degree of order but a high degree of specified complexity. In short, the redundant order of crystals cannot give rise to specified complexity of the kind or magnitude found in biological organization; attempts to relate the two have little future.

In referring to a specific set of spatio-temporal and functional relationships among their parts TB&O may be trying to tell us that informational macromolecules are only one component taken from a wider system, a system that as a whole has a configuration that is both highly ordered and yet highly complex. Taking one component out of that system such as an informational macro molecule, yields something that in a standalone sense is highly disordered and yet when placed within the context of the whole working system it is seen to be part of a highly organized system. Thus “specified complexity” is not a vitalistic property intrinsic to a sequence, but a property bestowed extrinsically by virtue of the sequence having a well-defined and orderly role in a much larger spatio-temporal configuration that certainly does not classify as disordered. “Specifity” is itself a configurational property that comes out of the configurational relations between an informational macromolecule and the spatio-temporal configuration in which it is embedded. Hence, we are back to where we were in my post on chapter 7: Biological structures are configurations in time and space, but they are neither highly ordered or nor highly disordered – they inhabit the space between the extremes of order and disorder. Perhaps the terms “complex organization” best describe these configurations. But although crystals are far too an elementary form of organisation to make a close comparison with life, there is, in spite of what TB&O say, a close relation between the process of crystallization and the conjectured process of evolution. But more about that another time.

The Mystery Deepens

I was fascinated to read this post on UD where William Dembski appears to disassociate himself from Young Earth Creationism (At least that’s how I read it). He suggests that attempts to conflate ID and YEC are motivated by a desire to discredit ID by associating it with YEC. Surely Dembski isn’t hinting that YEC is a bad thing to be associated with?

Once again Demsbki stresses that “ID, per definitionem, is the study of patterns in nature that are best explained as the product of intelligence.”

He also tells us:

It [ID] rests on two pillars: (1) that the activity of intelligent agents is sometimes detectible and (2) that nature may exhibit evidence of intelligent activity. How anyone gets young-earth creationism from this is a mystery.

I may agree with that, but since evolution would also classify as a pattern of nature (assuming nature exhibits such a pattern) then using the very criteria employed by ID theorists for identifying the work of intelligence doesn’t it also follow that the very peculiar and customized patterns required by evolution are arguably also the work of intelligence? So why doesn’t Dembski give more credence to evolution as at least a candidate pattern displaying evidence of Intelligent Design? What is different about evolution in the eyes of the ID/YEC axis? Is it because both hanker after an “in yer face” supernaturalism? How anyone gets antitheism from evolution is a mystery.

Characters of the Wild Web No. 18: Billy the DembskID - “The man the authorities came to blame for something that he never done (sic )....but one time he could-a been the champion of the world"

The Glasshouse Effect

Just a couple of comments on two blog posts I want to make a note of:

Uncommon Descent.
This post on Uncommon Descent made me laugh. I can understand UD’s feeling that it’s one law for them and another for established scientists! The papers the post refers to can be found here and here. What do I file these papers under? Hoax Physics, Crank Physics or just “Edgey”? Whatever; it appears that they have already been classified by their peer group as professional physics.

Sandwalk
This looks to be quite a promising departure on Sandwalk. It is a link to Jim Lippard’s blog. Lippard is an atheist, but he seems to be asking those reflexive epistemological questions that we should all be asking: What is science? How do we know things? Why do we believe? Etc. Given that questions over the primary ontology of the cosmos is a highly speculative area,bound up with philosophy and epistemology, it is only natural that people attempting to arrive at preemptive proposals/views in this area will tend to come up with different speculations ranging from theism, simulated universes, multiverses, self organizing principles, postmodern nihilism etc. Where things go wrong, I feel, is when particular proposals become the jealously guarded property of some subcommunity which then, with religious zeal, embarks on the hard oversell of their views.* In particular, I cannot go along with Christians who take the position that atheists must all have bad consciences because they are willfully holding out against some Gnostic or fideist revelation. Atheism, in my view, is just one of a set of plausible constructions given the human predicament. Conversely, I must set against this those atheists who frequently accuse others of irrationality and yet themselves appear to be unself-critical, and lacking in both reflexivity and self-scepticism.

But the good news is that Lippard appears to be asking the right kind of questions, questions that both hardened atheists and religionists need to be asking themselves. A step in the right direction I feel.


Addendum: I notice that Larry Moran of Sandwalk says he hasn't the time to debate Lippard. It may be just me but haven't I noticed before that he's stayed well clear when things start to get edgy? The "fringe" isn't for him and I suppose that we need people like him to keep things anchored. But there is more to scepticism than bread and butter science - and "bah humbug".

* Footnote
To be fair this is probably an effect of communities polarizing against one another; if one community makes signals indicating what they think of as their spiritual/intellectual superiority in comparison with another community, the latter community, tit for tat, will respond in kind.

The Neurological Problem

The Following is a comment that I intended to put on James Knight’s bog here but for some reason I was denied the paste option, so I’ll have to post it here instead:

I think this is what they call the “hard problem” – that is, just how does the subjective first person perspective of “qualia” marry with the (putatively) objective third person perspective? The latter perspective only recognizes first person mental processes as neuronal activity. In fact when the third person gets up close to the first person he only ever sees neuronal activity.

This issue, especially amongst materialists, is often cast in a mold which assumes the third person perspective is somehow more fundamental and “real” than the seemingly private world of first person qualia. This position is apt to overlook the fact that third person perspectives also necessarily involve a sentient agent, an agent that does the observing and reports in third person language; it’s a position that vaguely resembles the N-1 test for egocentricity or those fly on the wall documentaries where the necessary presence of the camera man is all too easily forgotten. In the final analysis the third person perspective entails an unacknowledged first person perspective. This failure to count the third person encourages the construction of a materialist ontology that uncritcially by passes the implicit assumption of sentience entailed by the observations needed to construct a third person narrative.

As both first and third person perspectives necessarily involve persons, the “hard problem” in actual fact seems to amount to this: Just how do the qualia of the first person register themselves in the qualia of the third person? That is, what does the third person observe (i.e. experience) when he attempts to investigate the first person's qualia? The answer to that is that the third person, when he takes a close look, only ever observes these qualia as neurological activity. How then do the first person qualia map to this activity?

Regardless of the question of just whether or not the third person perspective reveals a fundamental and primary materialist ontology behind qualia, it seems to me that the human perspective is forever trapped in the dichotomy of two stories; the “I-story” of first person qualia and the “It-story” of third person observations of other people; this latter story is told in terms of human biology.

I like the proposal that there is point by point conformity between these two stories; that is, for every first person experience of “qualia” there is a corresponding event in the third person world of “materials”. (However, I wouldn’t want oversell this idea, or be too committed to it)

With reference to the latter proposal it is worth recalling that neurologically speaking the mind probably has a chaotic dynamic, and thus is sensitive to the butterfly effect. Therefore even though we may eventually come to tell and understand the principles of the "I-story" in terms of neurogical activity (as we might fancy we understand the principles of weather) it looks as though under any circumstance minds, like the weather, will forever generate effects of which we will have no clue from whence they came.

A Proposed Problem Solution

This post concerns a little computational conundrum that I been pondering for some time. I now think I may have a handle on the solution.

Firstly some preamble.

Let’s assume that we can represent a general computation using a model similar to one I suggested in this post as follows:

Imagine a very long binary string – long enough to express any kind of computer output or result required: Now imagine all the possible binary strings that this string could take up and arrange them into a massive network of nodes where each node is connected to neighboring nodes by a incremental change of one bit. Hence, if the binary string has a length of Lr (where r stands for ‘result’) then a given binary configuration will be connected to Lr other nodes where each of these other nodes is different by just one bit.

Given this network picture it is possible imagine an ‘algorithm’ tracing paths through the network, where a path effectively represents a series of single bitwise changes. These paths can be described using another string, the ‘path string’ which has a length represented by Lp.

The essential idea here was that algorithmic change involves a path through a network of states separated by some kind of increment; in this case a bit flip. Since I wrote the above I have stayed with the general idea of a network of binary patterns linked by some form of increment, with algorithmic change effectively being a route through this network. However, in the above model the patterns are networked together by bit flipping – this seems a fairly natural way of linking the binary patterns, but as I have thought about it I have come understand that the method of linking the patterns depends on the computing model used; in fact the computing model also seems to effect the set of patterns actually allowed and even just how the “cells” that host the binary bits of the pattern are sequenced. Once these network variables are specified it is only then that we can start considering just what the computing model thus defined can be programmed to do. In this network model of computation I envisage both the running of the computation engine, its program and its workings in memory to be uniquely represented by network patterns; thus part of a particular pattern will represent the computation engine’s state and its program.

So how does this pan out for say a Turing machine? The configurational state of the Turing machine’s tape in terms of allowed characters seems to have no limitation – all configurations of characters are allowed. But it seems that not every network transition is allowed. If we take into account the fact that we must represent the position of the machine on the tape as part of a network pattern, then it is clear that arbitrary pattern transitions can’t be made; a character cell on the output tape cannot be changed if the machine is not at that position. There will also be some limitations on the actual patterns allowed, for depending on how we are to code the machine’s programs, we will expect syntax limitations on these programs. So a Turing computing model puts some constraints on both the possible network configurations and the network transitions that can be carried out.

Another point to make here is that what classifies as an incremental change in one computer model may involve a whole sequence of changes in another. Compare for example a Turing model with a “counter program” computing model. The Turing model is fairly close to my bit flipping model; changes in the tape involve simple character swaps. However, in a counter program the variables are numbers and the increments are plus or minus 1. This means that the character patterns of two numbers separated by the increment of 1 can look very different; e.g. 9999 + 1 = 10000. Thus, in counter programs two patterns separated by an increment of 1 or -1 may have more than a one character difference.

So what is my problem and how does the forgoing preamble help?

The problem I have pondered for some time (for a few years actually!) arises from the fact that there exists a class of small/simple programs that can in relatively quick time generate disordered patterns. (Wolfram’s cellular automata pictures are an example). It follows therefore that there is a “fast time” map from members of this class of a small programs to members of the class of disordered patterns.* But the class of disordered patterns is far, far greater than the number of short programs. Hence we conclude that only a tiny subset of disordered patterns map to “fast time” small programs. Now here’s the problem: Why should some disordered patterns be so favoured? The link that a relatively small class of disordered patterns have to simple mathematics grates against my feeling that across the class of disordered patterns there will be symmetry and no disordered pattern should be specially favoured.

My current proposed solution to this intuitive problem is as follows. The computing model is a variable and hence it is very likely that different computing models will favour different sets of disordered patterns with a map to fast time generation algorithms. In fact my guess is that the computing model variable has such a large degree of freedom that it is possible to find a model that will generate any configuration in fast time given the right model. The computing model variable thus restores symmetry over the class of disordered configurations. But in order to cover the whole class of disordered configurations with fast time maps where does the enormous variability of the computing model come from? It seems to come from several sources: One, as we have seen above, is the way the computing model wires the network of increments. Another degree of freedom is found in the sequencing off the patterns in the network: A Turing machine, via its quasi continuous movements up and down a tape of cells, effectively imposes a particular order on the cells of the output. It is possible to imagine another Turing machine that has an entirely different cell ordering and thus it would access an entirely different set of disordered configurations in fast time. I suggest, then, that the possibilities of the computing model look to be enough to cover the whole class of disordered configurations with fast time maps, thus restoring the symmetry I expect.

* Footnote
The “Fast Time” stipulation is important. Some single simple programs can, if given enough time, eventually generate any selected pattern and thus on this unrestricted basis a simple program maps to all output configurations.

Does Alpha's Poll Exist?

Characters of the Wild Web: Myers’ raiders ransacking the Alpha Course web site.

I notice that PZ Myers' raiders are out and about again causing gratuitousness grief. This time they have completely wrecked an Alpha course poll! (see http://scienceblogs.com/pharyngula/2009/10/alpha_pollalready_demolished.php) Here's the Alpha poll page last time I looked:

Does Alpha's poll exist? No, thanks to Myers' invasion.

It think it's going to be pretty "Nicky Grumble" at Alpha HQ when the good Rev sees this. PZ had better watch out, Rev Gumbel has quite a few troopers behind him as well - Just how many supporters have been through Alpha courses? (I'm not one of them I must add)

The End of Puzzlement?

The juggling act in which William Dembski has to engage in order to maintain popular appeal amongst a broad church ID/YEC movement may be evidenced in his UD post advertising his latest book “The End of Christianity”. I’ve always been rather puzzled by his position and the following quote taken from the UD post only compounds my puzzles: “Even though argument in this book is compatible with both intelligent design and theistic evolution, it helps bring clarity to the controversy over design and evolution.”

Dembski gives every impression of being a very nice guy, but over in America this evolution/ID debate sometimes resembles a kind of football culture with star players getting money and accolades, and supporters fanatically sold out to their respective sides. I’m unsure about whether or not Dembski’s position is compromised by having an adoring “fan club” and, who knows, wealthy benefactors as well. Is fan club driven science a good atmosphere for a dispassionate perspective on the cosmos, a perspective that is far healthier when one is prepared to face one’s demons rather than one's fans? Will I buy the book? I’ll have to think about it.

Mr. Deism Speaks Out.

In this little piece (which includes a YouTube video) by PZ Myers, two points are worth noting:

a) The reference to evolution as a cruel and inefficient process

b) That evolution is a process which once started means that deity doesn’t need to expend further effort or even lift a finger to assist.

The irony is that many an ID/YEC pundit would agree on both points! That’s why atheist’s love “natural” evolution and ID/YEC’s hate it.

Darwin Bicentenary Part 27: The Mystery of Life’s Origin (Chapter 7)

I have been busy looking at the three online chapters of “The Mystery of Life’s Origin”, a book written by anti-evolutionists Thaxton, Bradley and Olson. The first of these chapters (chapter 7) introduces itself thus:

It is widely held that in the physical sciences the laws of thermodynamics have had a unifying effect similar to that of the theory of evolution in the biological sciences. What is intriguing is that the predictions of one seem to contradict the predictions of the other. The second law of thermodynamics suggests a progression from order to disorder, from complexity to simplicity, in the physical universe. Yet biological evolution involves a hierarchical progression to increasingly complex forms of living systems, seemingly in contradiction to the second law of thermodynamics. Whether this discrepancy between the two theories is only apparent or real is the question to be considered in the next three chapters.

In another passage we read:

It is often noted that the second law indicates that nature tends to go from order to disorder, from complexity to simplicity. If the most random arrangement of energy is a uniform distribution, then the present arrangement of the energy in the universe is nonrandom, since some matter is very rich in chemical energy, some in thermal energy, etc., and other matter is very poor in these kinds of energy. In a similar way, the arrangements of mass in the universe tend to go from order to disorder due to the random motion on an atomic scale produced by thermal energy. The diffusional processes in the solid, liquid, or gaseous states are examples of increasing entropy due to random atomic movements. Thus, increasing entropy in a system corresponds to increasingly random arrangements of mass and/or energy.

Thus far Thaxton, Bradley and Olson hint at a possible conflict between evolution and the second law of thermodynamics. At this stage, however, TB&O don’t claim an outright contradiction but rather an intuitive contradiction that needs to be investigated. Their caution is justified because there is a basic incoherence in TB&O’s statement of the apparent problem. They suggest a parallel between order and complexity, but the fact is that the most highly ordered systems, like say the periodicity one finds in a crystal, are the very antithesis of complexity. They also suggest a parallel between disorder and simplicity whereas, in fact, highly disordered systems, such as random sequences, are in one sense extremely complex rather than simple; their complexity is such that in the overwhelming number of cases they don’t submit to a description via some succinct and relatively simple mathematical scheme. There, is therefore, inconsonance in TB&O linking order to complexity and disorder to simplicity.

What may be confusing TB&O is the fact that highly disordered systems are statistically simple but not configurationally simple: Statistically speaking a very disordered system may be characterized with a few macroscopic parameters whose values derive from means and frequencies, whereas to pin a disordered system down to an exact configuration requires, in most cases, a lot complex of data. Where TB&O seem to fall down in chapter 7 is that they fail to make it clear that living structures are neither very simple nor highly complex, neither highly ordered nor highly disordered but are, in fact, configurations that lie somewhere in between the extremes of order and disorder, simplicity and complexity. As such the characterization of living things is neither amenable to simple mathematical description, nor statistical description.

That TB&O have misrepresented the order/disorder spectrum as a polarity between complexity and simplicity helps ease through their suggestion of an intuitive contradiction between evolution and the second law. Because they have identified high order with high complexity and because the second law implies a move away from order, then in the minds of TB&O it follows that the second law must also entail a move away from structural complexity, thus ruling out the development of the complex living structures as a product of thermodynamics. If TB&O were aware of the intermediate status of living structures in the configurational spectrum they may realize that the situation is more subtle than their mismanagement of the categories suggests.

Another nuance that doesn’t come out in chapter 7 of TB&O’s book is that disorder or entropy, as it is defined in physics, is a parameter that is not a good measure of the blend of complexity and organization we find in organic structures. In physics disorder is defined as the number of possible microscopic configurations consistent with a macroscopic condition: For example compare two macroscopic objects such as a crystal and an organism. A crystal on the atomic level is a highly organized structure and as such it follows that there are relative few ways the particles of a crystal can be rearranged and still give us a crystal. On the other hand a living structure has a far greater scope for structural variety than that of a crystal and it therefore follows that the number of ways of rearranging an organism’s particles without disrupting the abstract structure of the organism is much greater than crystal. Therefore, using the concept of disorder as it is defined in physics we conclude that an organism has a far greater disorder than a crystal. Given the middling disorder of organisms as measured by physics one might then be lead to conclude that in the slow run down of the universe from high order to low order the universe will naturally run through the intermediate disorder of organic forms. Clearly there is something wrong with TB&O’s presentation of the thermodynamic case against evolution. (To be fair I ought to acknowledge that ID theorist Trevors and, in this paper, does demonstrate an appreciation of the intermediate place occupied by the structures of life)

Consider also this quote from TB&O:

The second law of thermodynamics says that the entropy of the universe (or any isolated system therein) is increasing; i.e., the energy of the universe is becoming more uniformly distributed.

Precisely; when compared to the high concentration of energy in a star, the energy distribution in living structures is part of a more uniform distribution of the suns highly concentrated energy and therefore as far as physics is concerned it represents a more degraded form of energy. Admittedly, the thought that physics’ rather crude measure of disorder implies that living structures are an intermediate macrostate in the thermodynamic run down of the high concentration of energy found in a star is counter intuitive, but TB&O have so far failed to give a coherent statement of the thermodynamic problem in order to explain this seeming anomaly.

* * *

The second law of thermodynamics works because cosmic systems are walking randomly across the possible states open to them. Given this assumed random walk the overall trend, then, will be for those systems to most likely move toward categories of state with greater statistical weight. It follows, therefore, that classes of states which have a large statistical weight are, as time progresses, the most likely to be occupied by the system; for example heat is likely to move from a hotter region to a colder region because a uniform distribution of heat can be realized with a far greater number of microscopic arrangements than an heterogeneous distribution. A crucial feature of this physical model is the space of possible states. This is determined by the laws of physics which limit the number of possible states available. Through their sharply limiting the number of available states the laws of physics effectively impose an order on the cosmos. Because these laws transcend thermodynamics the order they impose on the cosmos is not subject to thermodynamic run down.


As I have indicated in this post, it is conceivable that the laws of physics are so restrictive, in fact, that they eliminate enough possible states to considerably enhance the relative statistical weight of living structures at certain junctures in the evolution of the cosmos. In effect these laws impose a state “bottle neck”, whereby in the run down to disorder the cosmic system is forced to diffuse through this bottle neck - a place where living macrostates effectively have a realistic probability of existence because their relative statistical weight is enhanced by the laws of physics. However, having said that I would certainly accept that ID theorists should challenge the existence of this state bottle-neck; it is by no means obvious that physics implies such a bottle-neck. But what I do not accept is the anti-evolutionist’s canard that the second law of thermodynamics in and of itself is sufficient to rule out a realistic probability of evolution. If the anti-evolution lobby wants to clinch their case they need to show that physics does not apply sufficient mathematical constraint on the space of possibilities to enhance the relative statistical weight of organic structures at certain stages in the run down to maximum disorder.

I agree with TB&O when they say:

There is another way to view entropy. The entropy of a system is a measure of the probability of a given arrangement of mass and energy within it. A statistical thermodynamic approach can be used to further quantify the system entropy. High entropy corresponds to high probability. As a random arrangement is highly probable, it would also be characterized by a large entropy. On the other hand, a highly ordered arrangement, being less probable, would represent a lower entropy configuration. The second law would tell us then that events which increase the entropy of the system require a change from more order to less order, or from less-random states to more-random states.

But the problem here is what TB&O leave unsaid. There is no quibble with the assertion that the second law of thermodynamics ensures a migration of an isolated system to its most probable class of state, as determined by statistical weightings. But, and this what TB&O don’t acknowledge, the details of that migration are sensitive to the constraints of physics and those constraints apply a transcendent order that is not subject to thermodynamic decay. These constraints may (or may not) considerably enhance, via a state bottle-neck, the probability of the formation of living structures as an intermediate state of disorder in the run down to the most probable state.

That TB&O fail to understand the essential issue is indicated from the following:

Clearly the emergence of order of any kind in an isolated system is not possible. The second law of thermodynamics says that an isolated system always moves in the direction of maximum entropy and, therefore, disorder.

The intent of this statement, presumably, is to dismiss the possibility of the evolution of life on the basis of the second law of thermodynamics. In TB&O’s minds their intuitive conclusion is safe because they have wrongly pushed living structures to the extreme ordered end of the order-disorder spectrum. They see no prospect of life arising because thermodynamic change is always away from order and in TB&O’s flawed opinion it must therefore always be away from the states of life.

Despite TB&O’s initial caution in pushing their belief it is clear that they think their conclusion is safe before they have demonstrated it:

Roger Caillois has recently drawn this conclusion in saying, "Clausius and Darwin cannot both be right."3 This prediction of classical thermodynamics has, however, merely set the stage for refined efforts to understand life's origin.

But to be fair to TB&O they don’t entirely dismiss evolution and they are prepared to consider those refined efforts to understand life’s origin. They engage in some uncontentious thermodynamic analysis showing that the sub systems in a system that is far from equilibrium may decrease in entropy. Hence the only hope that evolution has, they concede, is in the area of systems far from equilibrium. In this TB&O are right. Evolution, if it is to be found at all, will only be found in non-equilibrium systems; that is, systems that diffuse through a conjectured state bottle neck where the squeeze on the available states ensures that the relative statistical weight of living structures is enhanced, thus imbuing them with enhanced probability. But TB&O warn:

Nevertheless, one cannot simply dismiss the problem of the origin of organization and complexity in biological systems by a vague appeal to open-system non-equilibrium thermodynamics. The mechanisms responsible for the emergence and maintenance of coherent (organized) states must be defined.

On that point I certainly agree with TB&O: The appeal to non-equilibrium thermodynamics is vague and general and the mechanisms responsible for the emergence and maintenance of coherent (organized) states must be defined. In other words, is there any real evidence for a state bottle neck, a bottle neck that must be the general mechanism behind evolution? In my next installment I hope to see what TB&O’s chapter 8 has waiting for us on this important question.

Cellular Automata Part 3

In part 2 of this series I got to the stage where I accepted (with some help from Paul Abbots) that Wolfram’s principle of computational equivalence was at least a plausible enough conjecture to run with. As I understand it Wolfram’s conjecture is different to the Church-Turing thesis in that it ascribes universality not to computational models but to a class of single simple computations; according to Wolfram simple computations that look chaotic in output are, in most cases, likely to have the property of universality in that they can, with the right initial conditions, emulate any computation. Wolfram’s conjecture does have a deep intuitive plausibility because truly chaotic computations are forever generating novelty of configuration and thus one might expect that given enough time to create a long history of computation at some point they will emulate any chosen computation.

However, when I first came across Wolfram’s principle of computational equivalence in his YouTube lecture, this is how I responded:

On the subject of computational equivalence Wolfram is less compelling. Simple processes can produce the high complexity of disorder, but simple processes, which are relatively small in number, merely sample a very small part of the huge class of complex and disordered configurations. The only way of reaching this huge class is to start with complexity. Accordingly I am not sure I know what Wolfram means when he talks about a “maxing out” of complexity. Complexity of process seems to have no upper limit. Perhaps I do not understand Wolfram aright but it seems to me that there is a huge platonic realm out there of highly complex algorithms, whose rules are beyond our ken, algorithms whose computational resources are too great to be humanly manageable.

In saying that there is a huge class of complex and disordered configurations that are unreachable without the resource of a-priori complexity am I in conflict with Wolfram’s view? Yes and no. ‘Yes’ because if Wolfram’s principle is correct then in principle any configuration can eventually be reached from a simple single “chaotic” computation. (So in absolute terms what I have said above is wrong) And yet ‘No’ because I really only had practical computation in mind. In a very effective sense there is class of a configurations that are unreachable and this for the following reason. In most cases the program controlling a computation is a very much smaller object than the pattern of the computation itself; the reified computation often describes a very large object in both time and space. This means that the number of possible computations, in terms of combinatorial possibilities open to this huge domain of possible patterns, is far greater than then number of possible “small and simple programs”. Thus although according to Wolfram a small “chaotic” program may in time reach all possible configurations it will not be able to reach all configurations in realistic time, simply because there are too many of them. For small programs running on a given model of computation there will be a large class of configurations out of range as far as realistic computation times are concerned.

In part 2 of this series I conjectured that there was a complementary relationship between program size and computation times: Shortening program length increases the time lower limit needed to achieve a particular computation, whereas increasing program length by adding data allows the time lower limit to be reduced. Mathematically:

program length + computation time >= a constant for the given computation*

Or in abbreviated form:

P + T >= C,*

…. where I have sharpened up the notion of my original “equation” by relating the sum of P and T via an inequality to a constant that is set by the computation in hand. I have been looking into this conjectured relationship in order to put it on a more rigorous footing, but for good or bad I am going to run with it for the time being to see where it takes me.

The above equation suggests that C can be arbitrarily large. From this it follows that for these “large” computations a small P could only reify the computation after a very long time. However, the equation tells us that we can shorten computation times by increasing P; that is by increasing the complexity of the program itself. Thus whilst Wolfram’s principle of computational equivalence may be true in that any simple chaotic program may be used to describe an arbitrarily chosen computation, albeit in a prohibitively long time, complementarity means that it is also true that in order to achieve certain computations in realistic times prohibitively complex programs may be required. Thus in terms of achieving timely results there seems to be no upper limit on computational complexity and power; certain timely results will demand highly complex programs. This is the intent of my original statement: there are computations that are practically speaking unreachable, either that or they require enormous a-priori data resources.

If a physical theory works by using huge computational resources in terms of very large program strings and/or using very long generation times then humanly speaking it is of little computation utility to human beings. Fortunately for us the computational rules of the cosmic physical regime seem manageable both in terms of initial data and computation times. And yet “…it seems to me that there is a huge platonic realm out there of highly complex algorithms, whose rules are beyond our ken, algorithms whose computational resources are too great to be humanly manageable.” What if the randomness of quantum mechanics is absolute in that it is not the result of some underlying chaotic determinism like say decoherence but a brute given input to our cosmos? If that is the case then those random input configurations may be those that are practically speaking algorithmically unreachable. God knows.

Footnote:
* Obviously some nuancing of terms is needed here. Some "computations" appear to increase in computation time as input data length is increased; e.g. factoring a number.

Bunk

I recently read the following on the means that illusionist Deren Brown used to predict lottery numbers:

Sat 12 Sep 7:25 AM. By Press Association Press Association Illusionist Derren Brown claimed he was able to predict the lottery numbers just by combining the random guesses of a panel of members of the public. On Wednesday 2.7 million viewers tuned in to Channel 4 to see Brown perform his latest trick. Broadcasting from a secret studio location, Brown told viewers he had written his predictions on a line of balls, which he then revealed after watching the draw live on BBC1. He said "that's a year of my life right there. I can't believe it", as he turned over the balls to reveal they were an exact match for the winning numbers: 2, 11, 23, 28, 35, 39. On Friday night he told viewers that he used "a powerful beautiful secret that can only be achieved when we all put our heads together". He gathered a panel of 24 people who wrote down their predictions after studying the last year's worth of numbers. Then they added up all the guesses for each ball and divided it by 24 to get the average guess. On the first go they only got one number right, on the second attempt they managed three and on the third they guessed four. By the time of last week's draw they had honed their technique to get six correct guesses. Brown claims that the predictions were correct because of the "wisdom of the crowd" theory which suggests that a large group of people making average guesses will come up with the correct figure as an average of all their attempts.


The above is, of course, all part of the act of obfuscation. The things one has to say (and do) to be an illusionist.

Intellectual Bankruptcy

PZ Myers and Larry Moran both post on a YouTube YEC video promoting the population growth argument for a young Earth. (See here and here). The YEC argument from population growth uses a crass form of uniformitarianism that assumes a simple population growth formula and then plugs into this formula a growth constant in order to come up with a four and half thousand year history of uniformly exponentiating population growth since Noah.

To be fair we should of course use the very methods of YEC’s science of negation to question the simplistic assumptions built into their calculations. This would no doubt lead us to consider just what affects the vagaries of food supply, predation, disease, and climate etc. might have on the fluctuating fortunes of a struggling small population.

But then this exercise has little to do with science; it is slick showmanship and sales talk directed at the converted in order to convince them that the 6000 year old Earth theory is in safe patriarchal hands thus promoting the sense of security needed to bolster fundamentalist flocking instincts.

But it cuts no ice with critics; Myers and Moran laugh the video to scorn. For them the whole thing is a joke and further evidence of the intellectually debauched state of Christianity, which in turn is further confirmation that Christians can make no claim to special revelation from a Divine being. But the trump card of YEC theorists is fideism: “For the preaching of YEC theory is foolishness to those that are being lost, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God”.


Stop Press 4/9/9
In this link PZ Myers notes the impenetrable fideist defensive barrier that the Mormons have thrown up; you have no chance of seeing the truth of Mormon history unless you believe Mormonism in first place – and that only comes to those with a sublime connection with the “Spirit of God”

What was that again?

I recently received this rather terse e-mail from a James E Grambrell.

The term "quantum physics" should be avoided. The preferred term currently is "quantum mechanics. This will continue until it is recognized that Physics and Quantics are separate but overlapping disciplines. James E Gambrell.

Was it in response to my passing reference to “quantum physics” in my last post? I hadn’t heard of quantics until this e-mail and so I did a little web work. Top of the Google search list for quantics was a consultancy who specialize in pharmaceutical, health and ecotoxicology statistics. It can’t be that. An online dictionary defined a quantic to be a homogeneous polynomial having two or more variables. It can’t be that. However I eventually found a web pages claiming that quantic physics was a new philosophy, and this is what I read:

Quantic physics says that everything that we see isn’t the images that we really see with your eyes. But it’s an image that is being created from our mind.

My best guess is that that is trying to tell us that reality isn’t “out there” but “in here”.

But if it's all "in here" then there is no "out there". But if there is no "out there" then there can be no "in here" because it can only be "in here" by virtue of its relation to "out there".