Let's Carry on Carriering Part V
This is my continuing critique of an article by commercial historian and unquenchable blowhard Richard Carrier. In his article Richard believes he has used probability calculus to show that "No god [is] needed" to create a universe. Well, in this instance there is no need for me to argue either for or against atheism; for the purposes of this post it is sufficient for me to show that Richard's misunderstanding and mishandling of probability and randomness hamstrings his polemic completely. In Part II I pointed out where his argument comes off the rails and from that point on he constructs a teetering house of cards.
The other parts of this series can be found here....
Quantum Non-Linearity: Let's Carry on Carriering Part I
Quantum Non-Linearity: Let's Carry on Carriering Part II
Quantum Non-Linearity: Let's Carry on Carriering Part III
Quantum Non-Linearity: Let's Carry on Carriering Part IV
On the whole Richard started his article well. In the first part of this series we saw Richard defining what he referred to as Nothing; note the capitalized N. Richard tells us that this kind of Nothing is what you are left with when all mere logical contingencies have been removed and one is left with a bare minimum of logical truisms, truisms which can't be removed without logical contradiction. I had no problems with this proposal. I also agreed that many of the classical "proofs" for God's existence are very dubious to say the least. But I noted that Richard said nothing about the actual content of this exotic and mysterious placeholder he calls "Nothing" and I went on to say that this omission allows theism to slip in by the back door. Richard might have attempted to lock and bolt the front door but he's left the back door wide open. However, for my current purposes there is no need for me here to smuggle in God using "back door theism" because my focus is on his foundational logical errors, errors which bring his house of cards crashing down, never mind that he's actually failed to even lock the front door.
Let me finish this opening section with this: As I might have said before, theism, particularly Christian theism, is at the very least a mythological world view which for me is the abductive narrative making a whole lot of retrospective sense of an otherwise very perplexing and meaningless world. Moreover, it provides compelling insights into the human predicament; for me personally it is a successful "Weltenschauung" (world-view) which is actually more than mythology; it is mythology++. However, we must concede that world-views attempt to encompass and synthesize a very wide field of proprietary experience and unique personal histories and therefore Worldview analysis is a rather subjective and contentious business on which the agreement theorem hits the rocks.
Although I would recommend Christianity to atheists even if they are to regard it as only a compelling mythological world-view, I nevertheless respect and understand their perspective given the cosmic context which has developed in our consciousness since the enlightenment ...although I have little sympathy with the kind of flawed and triumphalist polemic we get from Richard Carrier.
***
RICHARD: Probability of Something from Nothing. Proposition 8 holds that “when there is Nothing,” then “every possible number of universes that can appear has an equal probability of occurring,” and Proposition 9 holds that therefore “the probability of Nothing remaining nothing equals the ratio of one to n, where n is the largest logically possible number of universes that can appear.” We can therefore calculate limits on how likely it is that something would exist now, given the assumption that once upon a time there was Nothing—not a god or quantum fluctuation or anything else, but literally in fact Nothing.
MY COMMENT: I've already covered propositions 8 and 9 in part IV but I'll outline again Richard's two main embarrassments here.
In the above Richard has assumed that if he is given a probability this implies he has in his hands an objective source capable of randomly creating outcomes. This is an error on at least two counts as we will see. I can, however, accept this:
Proposition 8 holds that “when there is Nothing,” then “every possible number of universes that can appear has an equal probability of occurring,”
But then this doesn't follow:
Proposition 9 holds that therefore “the probability of Nothing remaining nothing equals the ratio of one to n, where n is the largest logically possible number of universes that can appear.”
As I remarked in the previous parts, probability is an intelligible concept only if one first assumes the existence of an observer who is able to form an enumerated (or denumerated) ratio of what are believed to be logical contingencies. That is, probability presupposes the existence of a self-aware observer cognitively sophisticated enough to express information in terms of Laplace's classical probability quotient. For example, in proposition 8 we really haven't got a clue as what this mysterious object or entity called Nothing is likely to create, if anything at all. Therefore Richard is right in suggesting that in the absence of any further information “every possible number of universes that can appear has an equal probability of occurring,” Well, as I know Richard himself realizes it's going to be quite an intellectual challenge denumerating all the possible universes in order to return a Laplacian probability ratio here, but the principle entailed is apparently coherent and comprehensible; for as far is our quantified ignorance is concerned we are left with a ratio of 1 to n where n is clearly some huge number.
But between the two propositions 8 & 9 there is a serious logical fallacy. The probability ratio of 1 to n pertains to an observer's subjective information level and not some potential creation dynamic which pertains to Nothing. Moreover, this probability is conditioned on our complete lack of knowledge as to which logical contingency of the n possibilities which Nothing, so called, will "choose" to create. Those apparent possibilities includes any number of n universes where n actually includes the "null" universe; that is, the universe with nothing in it. On this basis Nothing, so called, sounds like a pretty sophisticated object; don't you think Richard? (Arguing that with Nothing there is nothing to stop it creating something can be turned on its head: Viz: There is nothing to stop Nothing remaining as Nothing; this kind of polemic is just informal verbal sophistry!)
Well, we know that Nothing didn't create the null universe so on the basis of these informational conditions the probability of the creation of a particular universe, which I shall call Up, can be symbolized by:
Prob(Up/E) = 1/(n-1)
....where E is the information condition that a universe is known to exist, although at this stage we don't know which particular universe exists. Now, assuming we know which universe of the n-1 possible universes has been created (because we can look out and observe it) then n = 1. Therefore on these updated informational conditions...
Prob(Pu/E) = 1/1 = 1 !!!
...which only goes illustrate just how conditional probabilities are upon observer information. For the very reason that probability is a measure of observer ignorance it is an entirely incoherent move to then try to use it to impute a creative dynamic to an object such as Nothing of which we know very little. Probability in and of itself is not a creative dynamic; rather it concerns our knowledge or lack of knowledge about the object in question.
What is very clear is that whatever Prob(Pu/E) works out at we have no logical right to infer that Nothing will consequently generate universes at random....along such lines, I suspect, Richard is thinking. A quantified probability does not imply randomness, although the reverse is not true ....the patterns of randomness often entail probability because these patterns are so algorithmically complex that they are from a human angle, practically unknowable in succinct algorithmic terms. Therefore random outcomes can usually only be expressed in terms of probabilities (Unless we've got a book of randomly generated numbers which we've memorised!).
***
RICHARD: Assume
that only the numbers 0 to 100 exist, and therefore 100 is the largest
logically possible number of universes that can appear. In that event, the
probability that Nothing would remain Nothing (the probability of ex nihilo nihil) is 100 to 1 against. There being 101
numbers, including the zero, i.e. the continuation of nothing being the
condition of there arising zero universes, and only one of those numbers
constitutes remaining nothing, then there are 100 times more ways for Nothing
to become something, than to remain nothing. And when there is Nothing, there
is nothing to stop any of those other ways from materializing, nor does
anything exist to cause any one of those ways to be more likely than any of the
others.
It is therefore logically necessarily the case that, if we assume there was ever Nothing, the probability of ex nihilo nihil is less than 1%.
Of
course, 100 is not the highest number. Go looking, you won’t find a highest
number. It is in fact logically necessarily the case that no highest number
exists. So really, the probability of ex nihilo nihil is
literally infinitesimal—infinity to one against. One might complain that we
don’t really know what that means. But it doesn’t matter, because we can graph
the probability of ex nihilo nihil by
method of exhaustion, and thus see that the probability vanishes to some value
unimaginably close to zero.
MY COMMENT: Here we go again. Richard has projected his otherwise coherent probability examples onto the cosmos as if they entail a creation dynamic. This is very apparent in these sentences.....
In that event, the probability that Nothing would remain Nothing (the probability of ex nihilo nihil) is 100 to 1 against.
It is therefore logically necessarily the case that, if we assume there was ever Nothing, the probability of ex nihilo nihil is less than 1%.
So, according to Richard he can project what is in fact a purely subjective measure of information (i.e. probability) onto this mysterious big deal he calls Nothing and then come up with the conclusion that Nothing will very likely create a universe! This does not follow because those probabilities reside in his observer's head; those Laplacian ratios don't reside "out there".
***
RICHARD: We
therefore do not need God to explain why there is something rather than
nothing. There may also be something rather than nothing simply “because there
just is.” There isn’t any actual basis for assuming “nothing” is the natural
state of anything, or that there has ever really been nothing. We could
honestly just as fairly ask why should there be nothing rather than something.
No God is needed here. But even if we are to presume that there ever once was
Nothing, we still need no further explanation of why then there is something.
Because that there would be something is then as certain an outcome as makes
all odds.
Formally:
·
If Proposition 1, then Proposition 2
·
If Proposition 2, then Proposition 3
·
If Proposition 3, then Proposition 4
·
If Proposition 4 and Proposition 1,
then Propositions 5 and 7
·
If Proposition 5 and Proposition 1,
then Proposition 6
·
If Propositions 5, 6, and 7, then Proposition
8
·
If Proposition 8, then Proposition 9
·
If Proposition 9 and Proposition 1,
then the probability that Nothing would produce something is incalculably close
to 100% and therefore effectively certain to
occur.
MY COMMENT: Well OK let's run with the idea that "We do not need God to explain why there is something rather than nothing", whatever Richard means by "God" in this context. But according to Richard we do need two other things:
Firstly, of course, we need this enigmatic entity called "Nothing". But all we know about Nothing is that it is the irreducible logical truism left when all logical contingencies/possibilities have been eliminated; according to this account trying conceive absolutely nothing is in fact a contradiction (I suspect that's true). That word "Nothing" however, is a place holder for what may well be a very exotic truism capable of creating who knows what. Fair enough Richard, this point of yours has a good feel about it as far as I'm concerned.
But secondly, Richard is asking us to accept his very logically dodgy maneuver involving the projection of subjective probabilities onto Nothing and then assuming that this is sufficient to give Nothing a dynamic with creative potential. Well yes, Nothing may well be sophisticated enough to be creative (in fact as a Christian I believe this entity is creative) but to suppose that human ignorance somehow projects that creative potential onto Nothing is not the way to argue the case! It's a bogus argument. And I say it yet again; probabilities pertain to a measure of observer ignorance and don't create anything.
But if I'm understanding him aright Richard does have a fallback position which I can respect: He says above "There may also be something rather than nothing simply “because there just is.”. That is very reminiscent of this post of mine on Galen Strawson where I quote Strawson suggesting that the universe "just is"; that is, it's just brute fact and to hell with abductive mythologies like Christianity which bring sense, purpose and meaning. If you simply find it impossible to believe that some kind of personal God has created our kind of universe with its all too off-putting human predicaments and suffering, then I have sympathy with that response. But I'm not sympathetic with Richard's cack-handed logic pushed through with self-recommending claims about his intellectual authority. Self-praise is no recommendation.
****
As we've seen in the previous parts of this series the logic of Richard's list of connected propositions is OK up until about proposition 5 when his analysis really goes off the rails as he hits the question of probability and randomness. In the above Richard talks about not needing God. But whatever he means by God in this context, the creative potential he allocates to Nothing is startling to say the least and it looks suspiciously god-like. In particular if Nothing's creative powers extend to the capability of generating patterns of randomness that in itself is a pretty god-like trait: First and foremost random patterns are contingent - they have no logical obligation and there is no known logical contradiction entailed by their non-existence. Secondly, if we are talking algorithmic generation, randomness of varying degrees entails either very long and complex algorithms or very large generation times or a combination of both. In the ideal mathematical limit of pure randomness one or both of these two features extend to infinity.
If Richard is trying to tell us that the creative source he calls Nothing is in fact a generator of genuinely random patterns then I think we are clear what Richard Carrier's god looks like.
****
.....to be continued...?
There are still some remaining paragraphs to consider in Richard Carrier's post but as far as the thrust of my criticism is concerned his closing passages will entail just more of the same kind of critique; that is, criticism of his fallacies revolving round his misconceptions about probability and randomness. So, I may or may not finish the series depending on how I feel and whether I consider it to be time well spent....I'll see.
CAVEAT
Disagreeing with Richard Carrier on the above issues should not be taken as a sign that I identify as being a member of some polar opposite tribe. For example, it is likely that I agree with him on many issues particularly when he is criticizing the hard-right.
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