Consciousness vs. de facto ID's subliminal gnosticism

The organ of conscious cognition. Taken from the website

https://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/neuroscience/brainimaging/

This post on the de facto "Intelligent Design" web site Uncommon Descent and written by UD supremo Barry Arrington drew my attention to this article in Scientific American. Arrington's article, which is entitled Front runner for the most inane statement of 2018, tells us that the writer of the article: 

"....might as well have said, “I have a conscious thought that there is no conscious thought""

At first I thought I was going to agree with Arrington and that once again we had here another client who was going into denial about the existence of conscious cognition (See here for example*). But after reading the Scientific American article (which takes the form of an interview with philosopher Peter Carruthers) I came to the conclusion that not only did I agree with Carruthers but also that Arrington simply couldn't have read article and had dismissed it out of hand. In spite of the misleading title of the article (that is, "There is no such thing as conscious thought") it is nevertheless clear from reading it that Carruthers is not denying the existence of consciousness. Look at this for example (my emphases):

In ordinary life we are quite content to say things like “Oh, I just had a thought” or “I was thinking to myself.” By this we usually mean instances of inner speech or visual imagery, which are at the center of our stream of consciousness—the train of words and visual contents represented in our minds. I think that these trains are indeed conscious. In neurophilosophy, however, we refer to “thought” in a much more specific sense. In this view, thoughts include only nonsensory mental attitudes, such as judgments, decisions, intentions and goals.These are amodal, abstract events, meaning that they are not sensory experiences and are not tied to sensory experiences. Such thoughts never figure in working memory. They never become conscious. And we only ever know of them by interpreting what does become conscious, such as visual imagery and the words we hear ourselves say in our heads.

The parts of the above quote I have emphasized I interpret to imply that Carruthers is not denying the existence of consciousness, (that really would be inane!) but accepts it as a facet of mind, albeit only a facet.  I'm not going to comment here on the rightness or wrongness of the model of the mind Carruthers is working to, but instead simply agree with the general thrust of Carrunthers argument. Viz: That consciousness is, as it were, just the shore line ports of a huge continental hinterland of supporting cognitive content and activity (which is what Carruthers means by "thought"). Consciousness is just the visible tip of an iceberg of unconscious thought. Actually at one level this thesis is fairly intuitively obvious: Most of us will accept that all those neurons and constituent molecules are working furiously to give us the first person experience of mind and yet the theoretical processes that control neurons and their molecular constituents are clearly completely unconscious as far as the first person perspective is concerned.

I personally don't see consciousness as a passive epiphenomenon but something that has a coupled relationship with the cognitive hinterland; that is, one effects the other and vice versa.  Carruthers appears to agree:

We can still have free will and be responsible for our actions. Conscious and unconscious are not separate spheres; they operate in tandem. We are not simply puppets manipulated by our unconscious thoughts, because obviously, conscious reflection does have effects on our behavior. It interacts with and is fueled by implicit processes. In the end, being free means acting in accordance with one’s own reasons—whether these are conscious or not.

This is very much in line with my own ideas. See my Thinknet project.

Carruthers proposes that we have to interpret our own minds just as we have to interpret the minds of others:

Let’s take our conversation as an example—you are surely aware of what I am saying to you at this very moment. But the interpretative work and inferences on which you base your understanding are not accessible to you. All the highly automatic, quick inferences that form the basis of your understanding of my words remain hidden. You seem to just hear the meaning of what I say. What rises to the surface of your mind are the results of these mental processes. That is what I mean: The inferences themselves, the actual workings of our mind, remain unconscious. All that we are aware of are their products. And my access to your mind, when I listen to you speak, is not different in any fundamental way from my access to my own mind when I am aware of my own inner speech. The same sorts of interpretive processes still have to take place.

I would rather say that consciousness is not what we generally think it is. It is not direct awareness of our inner world of thoughts and judgments but a highly inferential process that only gives us the impression of immediacy.

This first paragraph here, again concurs with my own thinking on the subject of language interpretation; namely that "words" do not contain meaning but rather our unconscious minds deliver conscious meaning to the string of input symbols we call natural language. It is notable that this is one area where Christian fundamentalists are inclined to err (See here).

Finally Carruthers is completely frank on the big question of what physical conditions (i,.e. the third  person scientific perspective) correlate with the stream of consciousness:

Interviewer: Brain researchers put a lot of effort into figuring out the neural correlates of consciousness, the NCC. Will this endeavor ever be successful?

Carruthers: I think we already know a lot about how and where working memory is represented in the brain. Our philosophical concepts of what consciousness actually is are much more informed by empirical work than they were even a few decades ago. Whether we can ever close the gap between subjective experiences and neurophysiological processes that produce them is still a matter of dispute.

***

So, I generally concur with Carruthers thoughts on this matter,. However, I doubt if Carrutthers would agree with my "cognitive positivism"; namely, that without a stream of consciousness, a stream which gives meaning to observation and thinking, the very idea of reality becomes hazy and murky. Without the conscious observer who experiences and pieces together a rational world it is difficult to give  any compelling conceptual substance to a world absent of conscious observers. In this particular connection I say this only as a matter of course; it is an idea I have developed and continue to develop elsewhere.

Where I have common ground with Carruthers and major differences with Arrington is on the subject of dualism. Carruthers, who is likely to be an atheist, will probably believe in a God-free material monism. And yet he should rightly throw up his hands at some of matter's mysteries; after all, how is it that matter:

a) Has the potential to generate a stream of conscious thinking.
b) Presents us with the information mystery of evolution.
c) Inevitably leaves us with the question of why there is something rather than nothing.

Carruthers may think anyone like myself as a nincompoop for bringing God into it. But, nevertheless I have this in common with him; namely, a belief that so called "matter", in its potentiality, remains a remarkable mystery that is wonderful and broad. For me who sees matter as God's creation that's no surprise. But dualist Western Christian culture, of which Arrington is an example, habitually works with a natural forces verses intelligent agency dichotomy which prompts this culture to play down the God-given properties of matter. To the de facto ID community matter is "material" but mind is "immaterial".  Therefore they are unable to take on board the idea that God is immanent in matter and that it is a channel of divine agency. The (subliminal) dualism of the Christian right-wing has a tendency to see mind and matter as incommensurable aspects of the world, perhaps even irreconcilable**. Western dualist Christianity, in its diffidence toward the material world, has an air of crypto-gnosticism about it; it has subliminally swallowed a gnostic-like spiritual warfare thesis, a thesis that views the material universe as somehow profane and fundamentally at odds with all that is sacred and spiritual.

Matter is curious stuff and transcends the categories of the right-wing Christian's mindset as (s)he fights a futile battle with an imaginary demiurge whose lie about being given all the kingdoms of the world has been promoted by a quasi-gnostic Christian culture (Luke 4:1-13).

Footnotes
* Looking back at the post I've linked to here, it looks as though I placed rather too much trust in what Arrington was claiming.

** The synchrony of gnosticism & dualism with the Christian right-wing seems to be connected with their cultural marginalisation and paranoid sense of embattlement against a hostile persecuting outside culture over which they feel they have little power to influence. Gnosto-dualism as a myth makes a lot of sense to people who feel they have their back to the corner.