The title should of course read "Has It Ever Occurred to You that We Might Both be Wrong?" Epistemic humility doesn't come naturally to human beings.
I side with those philosophers who prefer a broad
definition of science—the one that's more akin to "scientia" or the
German word Wissenschaft. According to this view, science is a way of knowing
based on evidence, rational thinking, and healthy skepticism. As long as you
are employing this approach, you are engaging in a scientific way of knowing.
This includes economists, physicians, and philosophers.
I largely concur
with this definition of science; all epistemic efforts juxtapose the “evidence”
of experiential protocols with theoretical narratives in an endeavor to work out
a synthesis between the two (See my side bar). So, in the final analysis a very
large class of theoretical narratives are “scientific” in as much as they
are attempts to make sense of the “evidential” samples of protocol experience. But having said that I must add the caveat
that “evidences” never constitute proof of a theoretical narrative in the sense
that those evidences can be used to rigorously derive the theory in question.
(See here)
According to the
foregoing sketch any epistemology
classifies as science if it involves setting narrative against the samples of
empirical protocols and then attempts to resolve their conflicts (rationally one
hopes!). But where I feel Moran falls down here is that he fails to emphasize the
effect of ontology on the effectiveness of our scientific epistemology: The
ontology of history, for example, is far less tractable to systematic
investigation than springs and chemical precipitates (See here). It is clear therefore that some ontologies
are more amenable to abductive inference from the window of our experience than others;
in particular, an ontology of erratics, irregularities and anomalies is
epistemologically difficult to handle. A consequence is that such ontologies
give scope for imaginative fantasy; see for example David Ike’s interpretation
of the human socio-political life and let’s be clear even Ike’s science is empirical in as much as it is an
attempt to make sense, albeit in a very idiosyncratic way, of his social
experience. But let’s also be clear that given an irregular ontology there
comes a trade-off:; the scope that such ontology gives for far reaching and visionary imaginative construction based on relatively paltry evidences must be set
against the likelihood of taking a wrong path. I see nothing wrong in imaginative
speculation provided it comes with the self-aware traits of skepticism and
self-doubt: These are traits we don’t see amongst the David Ikes or Ken Hams of
this world. Unfortunately there is no clear cut-off between science and bad
science – as the ontology gets less tractable the science gets more
subject to risky flights of the imagination. If we are to indulge in imaginative
science we do so at our own risk and must do so with self-awareness, unless we
are to succumb to self-delusion.
But although I
agree with a broad definition of science Moran, as an evangelical atheist, is anxious
to spread the word of atheism and therefore I am suspicious of his motives. My guess is that behind his wanting to broaden
the definition of science beyond the physical sciences is a latent intellectual
hegemony which seeks a basis from which to legitimize charges of scientific
heresy. Moran seems to be unaware that his broad definition of science
introduces a tradeoff between scientific comprehensiveness and epistemic risk
which in turn entails an epistemic spectrum with no clear cut-off between good
science and bad-science. I also suspect that Moran has conflated ontology and
epistemology to the extent that he has committed himself (unconsciously?) to a
belief that the mechanisms which facilitate the success of test tube
precipitating and spring extending science are comprehensive enough to provide
a model for what all science should look like. For myself I think it likely
that the historian, the social scientist and the theologian will always be with us as scholars operating an epistemology that in
detail looks very different to Moran’s. Moreover, it is certainly not clear just how
comprehensive is the standard model of physics, especially as physics itself teaches
us that at best physics is only a frame work that modulates the vicissitudes of
chaos, thus giving plenty of scope for those who might fancy they see patterns
in the chaos. But as for Larry Moran, my guess he thinks he knows in advance
how it all works (in principle; it's just the details that need filling out!), when in fact all he is seeing is the systematic/regular ontology
that gets selected out by a our systematic methods. I bet he thinks that the broad definition of science is a nifty way of excluding theology from the "empirical" club. In his darkest dreams he has no idea that this broad definition creates a demarcation problem that results in theology being embraced into science. If he wants to call theology "bad science" then perhaps he ought to get off his butt and shows us why it is so, given that it's a science that deals with an awkward high end ontology. Trouble is, he'd much prefer to write it off without serious engagement!
It is ironic that
in the final analysis all our theoretical narrative construction has to
ultimately face the sampling of empirical protocol evidence to a greater or lesser degree,
a degree that depends on how “hard” is the science we are dealing with and just how tractable its subject ontology.
For example, theology is unlikely to think of itself as empirical and yet that
is just what it is; it is an imaginative attempt to make sense of the human predicament
from the perspective of that predicament’s widest parameters. Fundamentalists
try to circumvent the imaginative component of theology by attempting to make
the Bible look like a set of observational protocols (“God Words”). This fundamentalist
scriptural epistemic does little justice to the formula Meaning = text + context, a formula that tells us that interpretation
is not an extrinsic property of language, but an extrinsic one arising from
language acting as a stimulant which brings forth meaning out of the context on
which it works. (under divine sovereign management, of course)
For those
schooled in the notion that empiricism is confined to the “majesteria” (silly term!) of spring
extending and test tube precipitating science, the idea that theology is actually
observational is difficult to take on board – see for example my discussions with doubting Christian James Moar.
I don’t think that during our discussion James got to grips with the idea that
theology suffers from the empirical-theoretical trade-off. The elementary
ontology behind springs and chemical precipitates has a strong empirical
component but correspondingly has less a priori cognitive input; what complex
awkward ontologies lose in empiricism they gain in a priori imaginative input,
but let us beware of the cost and the risk of going off at half-cock in this
case. James Moar was coming from a stronger evangelical position than myself
and was therefore looking, I guess, for a theology with a firmer basis of experiential
protocols, perhaps even some kind of personal “Wow!” type revelation
demonstrating God’s existence. In the end I don’t think he ever got his much wanted revelation and like myself he was left having to give his best shot at interpreting
what experience he has been given! But if God is the sort of God we think he is
(Hebrews 1:1ff) then we’re on to a winner!
Relevant links
http://quantumnonlinearity.blogspot.co.uk/2014/01/evidence-not-proof.html
http://quantumnonlinearity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/12/the-ultimate-conspiracy-theory.html
http://quantumnonlinearity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/11/the-premium-on-prediction.html
http://quantumnonlinearity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/11/50-years-ago-kennedy-assassination.html
http://quantumnonlinearity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/10/springs-precipitates-paranormal-and.html
http://quantumnonlinearity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/10/generalizing-science-beyond-test-tubes.html
http://quantumnonlinearity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/08/epistemic-notes.html
http://quantumnonlinearity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/proto-fundamentalist-epistemology.html
http://quantumnonlinearity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/01/generalised-fundamentalism.html
Relevant links
http://quantumnonlinearity.blogspot.co.uk/2014/01/evidence-not-proof.html
http://quantumnonlinearity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/12/the-ultimate-conspiracy-theory.html
http://quantumnonlinearity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/11/the-premium-on-prediction.html
http://quantumnonlinearity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/11/50-years-ago-kennedy-assassination.html
http://quantumnonlinearity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/10/springs-precipitates-paranormal-and.html
http://quantumnonlinearity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/10/generalizing-science-beyond-test-tubes.html
http://quantumnonlinearity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/08/epistemic-notes.html
http://quantumnonlinearity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/proto-fundamentalist-epistemology.html
http://quantumnonlinearity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/01/generalised-fundamentalism.html
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