In this post I continue analyzing a blog post by super-duper, self-recommending professional atheist Richard Carrier.
For most of the last two parts of this series (See Part I and Part II) I was actually getting on quite well with Richard's post titled The Problem with Nothing: Why The Indefensibility of Ex Nihilo Nihil Goes Wrong for Theists • Richard Carrier Blogs
I probably agree with Richard in so far as agreeing that many theists have muffed their arguments re. the existence of God. For example: The cosmological argument, the ontological argument, the fine-tuning argument, the Kalem argument, the first cause argument, the moral argument etc are for the most part polemical bodges. In fact, we can drop all those arguments in this particular connection as my terms of reference are restricted to a critique of Richard's post; in my opinion his arguments as to the ultimate source of the cosmos are no less bodged than those arguments for God I've listed. (And I say that as Christian myself; for me theism is a retrospective sense making abduction)
As we saw in Part II crucial to Richard's argument is his concept of "Nothing", that is "Nothing" spelt with a capital N. "Nothing" is the hard kernel of irreducible logical truisms that you are left with when you've subtracted all logical contingencies; that is mere logical possibilities. It's unfortunate terminology that he's called it "Nothing" because as we saw in Part II it is clear that Nothing is in fact Something and a very sophisticated Something at that! This is clear because to create Richard's much desired randomness a very sophisticated source of creation is required. Other than that, however, Richard doesn't and probably can't give us much detail about just what constitutes Nothing (= Something). I can go along with Richard's identification of this mysterious irreducible Nothing (= Something). Moreover, it seems that this Something is the origin of our apparently highly contingent universe with all its ordered and random complexities. Wow!
But in the second half of Part II, it became very clear to me that as he developed his reasoning our Richard, in his enthusiasm to debunk theism, is utterly unaware that he goes completely off the logical rails. The consequences of the resulting train cash are then felt throughout the rest of his post. As we get to his Proposition 7 he continues to consolidate his error....
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Richard: Proposition 7: If nothing (except logical necessity) prevents anything from happening to Nothing, then every logically possible thing that can happen to Nothing has an equal probability of occurring.
Every
logically possible thing that can happen to Nothing is as likely to happen as
every other possible thing that can happen. This is a logically necessary
truth. So it again cannot be denied without denying Proposition 1. Or, again,
Proposition 4, if you want to desperately wrestle again with what it means for
Nothing to be ungoverned by any rules about what happens—but you’ll lose every
time; because that’s what Nothing logically entails. So the only way out left
is to go all the way back to becoming one of those whackadoos who deny
Proposition 1. Good luck with that.
My Comment: Well, as I said in Part II, I would want to enthusiastically embrace Proposition 1 and Proposition 4, but as I also said in Part II, I certainly wouldn't accept Richard's interpretations which he goes on to construct upon these propositions.
As we've seen Nothing (= Something) is a very mysterious object, and Richard isn't elaborating it. That's fair enough though; we are all a bit in the dark about the Unknown God Something that is the origin of the universe. Richard acknowledges the existence of this Big Unknown in his entirely acceptable Proposition 3 where he says If there was ever
Nothing, then nothing governs or dictates what will become of that Nothing,
other than what is logically necessary. Whatever the Big Unknown is it must be logically necessary.
But, and here's the kicker, in the above courier font quote Richard also tells us:
if you want to desperately wrestle again with what it means for Nothing to be ungoverned by any rules about what happens—but you’ll lose every time; because that’s what Nothing logically entails.
Now compare that statement with Proposition 3 where we read If there was ever Nothing, then nothing governs or dictates what will become of that Nothing, other than what is logically necessary. Notice the difference? Richard has suppressed that Big Unknown; namely, "what is logically necessary". Clearly Nothing is governed by rules; that is the rules of logical necessity, whatever they may be. He also tells us above what he thinks one of those logical rules governing Nothing might be: Viz:
Every logically possible thing that can happen to Nothing is as likely to happen as every other possible thing that can happen. This is a logically necessary truth.
That is, Richard is trying to get past us the very questionable notion that equal a priori probabilities is a truism from which he can then deduce a dynamic which leads to every possible happenstance that can happen (presumably at random) at some point or other. But as I said in Part II, probability only coherently pertains to observer information about possible happenings. It is therefore contingent upon the existence of an observer whose information may vary from other observers; that is, equal a priori probabilities is an observer relative feature. Moreover, observers able to compute ratios of possibilities (which is how probability is defined) are necessarily very sophisticated entities, entities about which it is unclear whether they are logical necessities or not; certainly, when it comes to individual human observers it seems we are not talking logical necessity.
Richard then jumps from that error to another error: Viz: That of assuming that once one has a probability, it implies a dynamic about what then actually happens: I suspect he is thinking "randomness" here; randomness is a configurational object which does in fact display a highly complex form of contingency rather than being a logical necessity. Moreover, as we saw in Part II randomness does not necessarily follow from an observer relative probability.
In noting these logical errors there is no need to deny Proposition 1 as Richard's whackdoos do.
***
Richard: In case it’s not obvious, here is why Proposition 7 is logically necessarily the case:
1. For any one possible thing that can happen to Nothing to be more probable than another, some rule, property, or power would have to exist to make it so.
2. By definition Nothing contains no rules, properties, or powers.
3. Therefore, no rule, property, or power would exist to make any one possible thing that can happen to Nothing more probable than another.
4. Therefore, no possible thing that can happen to Nothing can be more probable than another.
So
accepting Proposition 1, and thus Proposition 2, you must accept Proposition 7.
As Proposition 7 merely states what is logically necessarily the case when 1
and 2. And 1 and 2 entail that that which is logically necessarily the case
must always obtain whenever there is Nothing.
My Comment: The foregoing is utterly incoherent. Richard is trying to tell us that Nothing has no rules and yet he has admitted that it is constrained by what is logically true (fair enough) and then goes on to identify what he thinks to be one of those logical truths : Viz equal a priori probabilities (which isn't a logical truth and is observer relative) and then wrongly logically connects this with a dynamic with the ability to generate contingencies (at random?). So again, whilst we can enthusiastically embrace propositions 1 and 2, I must reject proposition 7 which is a fanciful invention of Richard's imagination and is certainly not a logical truism.
In his proposition 8 Richard continues to build his house of cards.....
***
Richard: Proposition 8: If every logically possible thing that can happen to Nothing has an equal probability of occurring, then every logically possible number of universes that can appear has an equal probability of occurring.
This is logically entailed by the conjunction of Propositions 6 and 7. So again it cannot be denied without denying, again, Proposition 1.
My Comment: That's Richard's continued abuse of probability for you! As I've said probability is not logically fundamental or axiomatic. For probability to be an intelligible concept one must first posit observers sophisticated enough to construct and understand ratios of possibilities. And again, Richard wrongly assumes that probability logically entails the dynamics of random happenstance. So, as with proposition 7, in his botched enunciation of proposition 8 Richard finds himself up a creek without a paddle. He tries to pressure our acquiescence to this nonsense by the intimidating suggesting that if we don't accept it then we commit the cardinal logical sin of not accepting proposition 1. And I thought it was only cult leaders like Ken Ham who try to intimidate!
***
Richard's suggestion as to the potential source of the cosmos is beginning to look suspiciously like the passe notion of a random generator as the source of the cosmos and that we necessarily exist in what by chance is a very ordered part of that immense maximally disordered cosmos. I'm not going to be too hard on him here because this common fanciful invention of the imagination, which conjures up the specter of a meaningless random universe, is a nightmare which confronts us all at some time or other as it did for example Conan-Doyle's hero Sherlock Holmes in the short story, The Cardboard Box:
“What is the meaning of it, Watson?” said Holmes, solemnly, as he laid down the paper. “What object is served by this circle of misery and violence and fear? It must tend to some end, or else our universe is ruled by chance, which is unthinkable. But to what end? There is the great standing perennial problem to which human reason is as far from an answer as ever.”
So, I'm in no position to be judgmental of genuine boarder-line atheists (like for example Mr. mice guy Brian Cox and that should also include Don Cupitt) who are an understandably having a struggle giving meaning to the cosmos. But in Richard's case we must factor in that he is a professional atheist whose income depends on him fervently, vehemently and vociferously defending his brand of atheism just as theme park manager Ken Ham defends his lucrative brand of young earthism at all costs using the most insulting of spiritual terms about those who disagree with him, as we have seen.
...to be continued
INTERESTING LINKS
1. Sir Richard Attenborough's comments are worthy of applause in my view:
